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ABSTRACT: I will situate the fallacies approach to reasoning with the aim of making it more relevant to 
contemporary life and thus intellectually significant and valuable as a method for teaching reasoning. This 
entails a revision that will relegate some of the traditional fallacies to the realm of history and introduce 
more recently recognized problems in reasoning. Some newly recognized problems that demand attention 
are revealed by contemporary science studies, which reveal at least two tenacious problems in reasoning 
that I will explore in this paper. One of these problems is androcentrism, a ubiquitous problem with 
reasoning that feminists exposed in the twentieth century but that continues to pervade people’s reasoning. 
The other is biological reductionism in at least two specific forms: genetic determinism and adaptationism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper I explore the potential to situate and revise the fallacies approach to 
reasoning with the aim of recognizing and increasing its relevance to contemporary life 
and its pedagogical value; a side-effect this approach is that it raises new and important 
intellectual and scholarly issues about fallacies. The revision requires relegating some of 
the traditional fallacies to the realm of history and introducing more recently recognized 
problems in reasoning. Contemporary science studies indicate at least two persistent 
problems with reasoning that demand recognition by argumentation theorists. The first is 
the androcentric fallacy and the second is biological reductionism, most notably in the 
forms of genetic determinism and adaptationism. Acknowledging and teaching these 
fallacies will better equip our students to face difficulties of reasoning in their particular 
material and historical contexts. 
I narrowly define fallacies as common forms of argumentative reasoning that 
appear correct but are not,1 which emphasizes both their frequency and deceptive nature. 
 
1 This is a narrow definition both because it excludes problematic reasoning and beliefs outside of 
argumentation, and because it insists that there be some appearance of correctness and correspondingly 
something potentially deceptive about the reasoning. The assumption of commonness is standard in 
treatments of fallacy, although problematically vague and often empirically unsupported. My suggestions 
of updates to fallacy theory aim to increase that empirical support. 
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The criterion of “commonness” or frequency requires that we keep in sight of the 
situational variance in forms of reasoning. Commonness does not require universality and 
may be particular to certain modes and contexts of argumentation. Relevance to particular 
contexts of reasoning can explain both the appearance of strength and the fact of 
weakness in an argument. For instance, what might count as a weakness in a scientific 
context, such as an appeal to emotion, may be a real strength around the dinner table, and 
conversely details of sampling may have relevance and provide strength to scientific 
claims that the dinner table conversation eschews. Analogously, many of the forms of 
reasoning that were important to Aristotle seem quite peculiar from our perspective.  
Fallacy theory itself emerges from attention to specific and variable social 
situations, which sets a precedent for my approach, as does the fact that the fallacies that 
have seemed important have changed with historical context. Our own context reveals the 
operation of pernicious but persuasive androcentrism and biological reductionism, which 
I will explain in the bulk of the paper. There remains a great deal more to be done in 
situating fallacy theory than I can accomplish here, but I will finish by indicating some 
substantial intellectual and pedagogical implications. 
 
2. SITUATING FALLACY THEORY IN THE PAST 
 
Thinking about fallacy theory in terms of its material situation helps define not just the 
theory itself but what is meant by a fallacy. The history of fallacy reveals different 
concerns about vulnerability to error that theorists of argumentation have had at different 
historical periods, and among those concerns is the dependency of the error on more 
specific social contexts. The notion of fallacy is fairly recent, and not employed by either 
Aristotle or Locke, whose discussions of patterns in reasoning are nevertheless central 
among those that set the precedent for identifying what we now count as fallacies. Why 
some false moves often appear and have appeared reasonable cannot be answered in 
general. Thus, like Locke and Aristotle but at a much larger scale we must attend to the 
social constitution of what counts as an error, and what is deceptive about that form of 
erroneous reasoning, as well as what makes it common in certain material and historical 
circumstances. 
Historical lists of what we now call fallacies of argumentation developed in an ad 
hoc manner based on forms of reasoning that raised quite various types of problem for 
their historical and material situations. This heterogeneity and historical variability is not 
a problem unless we have cause to maintain that difficulties with reasoning are unified, 
and there seems to be no such cause. Quite to the contrary, the dynamism and variety of 
human cultures and forms of reasoning suggests that obstacles to good reasoning may 
vary dramatically. Therefore, I suggest that we consider the heterogeneity of fallacies, 
their lack of a general nature, and the complexity of the concrete examples, to be 
strengths in the history the fallacies approach to critical thinking. The mistakenness of 
fallacies and what obscures those mistakes are particular to their cultural situations. 
The situational dependence of fallacies is well recognized by some of the primary 
historical players. Aristotle recognized social context as significant for evaluating what 
we now refer to as fallacies of argumentation. He was ambivalent about the value of 
certain forms of persuasion, recognizing that the significance of a type of reasoning 
depends on social context. For certain situations Aristotle encouraged the use of 
 2
FALLACY FORWARD 
sophistical refutations in all contexts. He not only explained but sometimes accepted their 
tactical value, as Hamblin explains (1993/1970, p. 52). While in many places Aristotle 
criticized dissembling techniques, his mixed evaluations of particular forms of persuasion 
indicate that he recognized that different social contexts involve different rules of debate 
(Hamblin 1993/1970, p. 61). Ultimately Aristotle seems to struggle as much as anyone 
with how to distinguish good reasoning from bad (Hamblin 1993/1970, p. 65). Hamblin 
explains that this struggle results especially from Aristotle’s view that rhetorical force or 
persuasiveness can support logical validity (1993/1970, p. 72) rather than always 
competing with it such as to interfere with the recognition of good reasoning or mask it. 
The problems that concerned Aristotle were specific to a type of public academic 
debate in ancient Greece in which one tries to refute an opponent’s position. The 
refutations that Aristotle described as sophistical include a number of strategies that have 
little play in the 21st century global North, and therefore recent textbooks ignore many of 
the problems with reasoning that concerned him. Certain aspects of reasoning were of 
quite exclusive concern to the ancient Greek culture of argumentation, including for 
instance Aristotle’s fallacy of accent in which a meaning shifts because of word order. 
That is a feature much less common in contemporary languages than in the language of 
ancient Greece. 
There is a rich history of fallacies after Aristotle that leads me to our second point 
of interest: the fallacies identified based on John Locke’s discussions of patterns of 
reasoning. While Locke acknowledged as did Aristotle the unqualified problems 
presented in mistaken formulations of syllogistic argument, his most significant 
contribution to the development of fallacy theory concerns forms of reasoning that he did 
not consider always to be problematic. The forms of argument ad verecundiam or appeal 
to authority, ad ignorantiam or appeal to ignorance, and ad hominem or appeal to the 
person Locke considers among persuasive forms of reasoning. He maintains that they are 
inferior to ad judicium or appeal to proof because that promotes knowledge. Yet Locke 
seems to accept the first three means of argumentation as legitimate within practical 
political contexts (Hamblin 1993/1970, pp. 159-160).  
Aristotle and Locke are only the most famous of philosophers to have recognized 
the need to qualify the conditions for identifying fallacies, to recognize that some 
strategies of argumentation are valid in some particular situations but not in others. This 
sensitivity to social context is a defining characteristic of fallacies as an approach to 
reasoning. The situatedness of fallacies applies beyond the informal fallacies, because 
even formal fallacies depend on an argument being appropriately translated into and 
adequately represented by a system of formal logic, which is to say it depends on the 
contexts defined by that specific logic. Sometimes formal logic is taught as a way to 
capture a variety of natural language arguments, but this is merely specious, at best a tool 
to grab student interest. All accounts of errors argumentation are specific to a culture of 
argumentation. 
Recent centuries brought dramatic shifts in the European culture that includes 
Aristotle and Locke and that spread across the globe through colonization. There are 
many features we might consider about how our contexts of argumentation are different 
from those that interested earlier philosophers, including aspects of that colonization and 
our awareness of deeper and older problems with our heritage from the Greeks. At the 
same time we have seen the growth of science from a hobby of aristocrats into multiple 
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major international industries, which involve new forms of reasoning. Recent social 
philosophies of science such as Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism (1990) maintain 
that the progress of scientific understanding depends on public debate, which suggests 
that the epistemological engine of science is argumentation. As powerful and beneficial 
as science has been, it has critics at many different levels. Constructive criticisms of 
science can be found throughout the discipline of science studies that draws on 
philosophy, history, and social science; it reveals a number of patterns of error in 
scientific reasoning that can be identified as fallacies. The first of these I will examine is 
androcentrism, and the second is biological reductionism; both reveal common problems 
with reasoning in the culture of the global North. 
 
3. THE ANDROCENTRIC FALLACY 
 
I define the androcentric fallacy as the mistaken assumption that what is male or 
masculine is most important. This may take the form of either using what is specifically 
masculine to set general standards or assuming that masculinity is in some way superior 
or primarily significant. We can find extensive evidence for this sort of reasoning in 
everyday discussion and argumentation, despite decades of feminist work to counteract it. 
This tenacity is strong evidence that the problem is not only common but very deep, even 
in contemporary science.  
Much of feminist critique and especially the feminist critiques of science can be 
viewed as a project of revealing androcentric reasoning. Certainly there is more to sexism 
inside and outside of science than what goes on in argumentation and more to feminist 
critique than identifying androcentrism; yet argumentation is central to the development 
of scientific knowledge, and scouting for the priority accorded to masculinity is basic to 
feminist analysis. I will examine how two different areas of scientific reasoning involve 
androcentric arguments, beginning with the Gilligan-Kohlberg debate in developmental 
psychology. Second, Elisabeth Lloyd’s study of the female orgasm shows how extensive 
and deep androcentric reasoning can be in science. 
However, before we consider these case studies, I will explain the general reasons 
for treating androcentrism as a fallacy of presumption. Ad hominem, ad verecundiam and 
ad ignorantiam are sibling fallacies to androcentrism, which we might translate or 
generally describe as the “appeal to masculinity,” just like an appeal to the person, to 
authority, or to ignorance. Considering inappropriate androcentric appeals as failures to 
demonstrate the relevance of a presumption allows us to recognize that androcentricity is 
sometimes appropriate, that is when the topic is only men, and not for instance women.2  
Taking a masculine standard provides for effective reasoning in medical research about 
men, and in romantic considerations about men, or in any other argument where the 
subject of inquiry is exclusively male. Fallacies of presumption are perversions of 
argument schemes that are quite worthy in other specific cases. This reflexivity holds for 
appeals to authority, and emotion, and many more forms of presumptive reasoning, as 
                                                 
2 When appropriate I choose to use the language of “men” and “women” which implies adult humans in 
place of the clinical “male” and “female” because it is important to recognize that these ideas affect people 
not just classifications, or concepts, or nonhumans. We should also keep in mind that androcentricity 
marginalizes intersex and transgender people as well as women. Gender dimorphism is a further problem 
with our reasoning, but I doubt we are yet ready to acknowledge that as fallacious. 
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Douglas Walton argues (1996). The recognition of presumptive arguments as 
unacceptable versions of potentially acceptable argument schemes has also filtered into 
the textbooks, as evidenced by the fact that the fallacy of ad verecundiam is now most 
often described as inappropriate appeal to authority or expert opinion. Furthermore, 
historically, as I explained above, the fallacies of relevance or presumption, the “ad…” 
arguments have been recognized primarily based on the work of Locke, who originally 
viewed their strength to vary with social context.  
Admittedly, androcentrism in reasoning can be a matter of linguistic ambiguity as 
when using masculine pronouns in English as if they were neutral, a practice now mostly 
exorcised from scholarly speech. Because ambiguities complicate androcentrism and hide 
it, we may have difficulty detecting deep androcentrism. Furthermore, there is a 
distinguishing rhetorical appeal to androcentricity in a patriarchal society, just as there is 
to authority in any society with divisions of cognitive labour (Hanrahan and Anthony 
2005). People say of androcentric language that “it sounds better,” or “it’s less awkward.” 
This speaks to the persuasive force of androcentrism and indicates the tendency to be 
deceptive that distinguishes fallacies from other common errors in argumentation. Yet 
androcentrism is not only a semantic, psychological or rhetorical issue, but also a 
question of the logic that goes on in argumentation because of its presumptive 
significance; and it operates at many other levels for which I cannot begin to account.  
Some might suggest that the androcentric fallacy is better understood as an appeal 
to emotion—masculine pride or feminine modesty, or as a hasty appeal based on 
masculinity instead of the broader humanity, such that it would amount to a form of 
“hasty generalization,” an evidential or scientific fallacy. I accept that all these factors 
and probably many more can play into androcentrism, just as linguistic ambiguities 
regarding noun gender have done. However, any one of these characterizations is too 
narrow, and we must recognize taking the masculine as ideal or fundamental to be a 
fallacy of presumption unto itself.  
Lawrence Kohlberg’s research in developmental psychology is famously 
androcentric. Admittedly the differences between men and women that Kohlberg 
overlooked and that Carol Gilligan pointed out now seem to be based more on education 
than on gender. However that complication does not excuse the androcentrism in 
Kohlberg’s reasoning or disprove its existence, nor would it had women turned out to be 
the same as men in the development of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s error results from 
assuming both androcentricity and fallacious classism. Whether or not Kohlberg was 
conscious of his prejudices, the academic audience that received his work certainly did 
not notice the methodological errors in his work until Gilligan revealed it. The difficulty 
of distinguishing whether a particular piece of bad argumentation is due to one type of 
error or another—androcentrism or classism in this case—is typical of fallacies. For 
instance, many circular arguments depend on ambiguous expressions, and fallacious 
appeals to authority may involve appeals to force. 
The most extensive revelation of how androcentrism has undermined a whole area 
of science is certainly Lloyd’s exhaustive study of the biological research into the female 
orgasm (2005). Lloyd identifies androcentrism in two of the assumptions that turn up 
regularly in all of the twenty-one theories about the evolution of the female orgasm that 
she scrutinizes. These assumptions are specifically (1) “that sexual intercourse evokes the 
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same response in men and women, namely orgasm” (p. 224) and more generally (2) “that 
female sexual response is like male sexual response.” (p. 225)   
For example, most accounts of the female orgasm assume it fosters pair bonding, 
and Desmond Morris’ 1967 theory is the influential source of this approach. In 
developing this theory, Morris’ assumption that sexual intercourse is the only context of 
female orgasm is not merely unwarranted but contrary to evidence available in the 
literature of the time, including work that Morris cites, such as Kinsey et al. (1953), and 
Masters and Johnson (1966). Thus Morris is led to the false conclusion, also disproved in 
the literature he cites, that females take longer to orgasm than males (Kinsey et al. 1953, 
164).  
Even more dramatically, Lloyd points out (2005, p. 58) that Gallop and Suarez in 
1983 employ as evidence for their assumption that women become tired after orgasm the 
Kinsey et al. study from 1948 which is exclusively about male sexual response; and there 
was substantial further contrary evidence by the point at which Gallup and Suarez wrote. 
Three of the first eighteen accounts Lloyd analyses assume generally that female sexual 
response is like male. Further, eighteen of the full twenty-one different theories that 
Lloyd was able to identify assume that female orgasm occurs only in intercourse (Lloyd 
2005, 204). 
 
4. BIOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM 
 
Another persistent problem with reasoning that has been identified by science studies and 
that we should recognize as a fallacy of presumption is biological reductionism. Certainly 
there is sometimes reason to assume that a characteristic of an organism has a distinctly 
biological origin (noting that “biological origin” can mean many different things). 
However, at least in the case of reasoning about human beings and other social animals 
there is need for extensive care in biological appeals. Because scientists recognize that 
biological forces such as genetics and natural selection are intertwined and 
interdependent with human culture, only in quite specific cases ought we to assume that a 
feature has a biological basis. Yet, biologically determinist accounts are often assumed 
without sufficient evidence. Therefore, I suggest that any automatic assumption that a 
feature has its source in either genetics or in natural selection is fallacious.  
In the sciences of intelligence biological reductionism has been extremely 
destructive and politically pernicious, as Stephen Jay Gould argues in The Mismeasure of 
Man (1996). Gould argues that instead of appeals to genetics the better explanation of 
intelligence is cultural evolution, which is itself a genetic adaptation but allows for much 
quicker and more flexible adaptation than genetics can otherwise manage. Given that the 
available science supports the plasticity of not only intelligence but various social traits, a 
populace that can adequately appreciate evolutionary arguments must be wary of treating 
appeals to genetics as prima facie acceptable explanations for social phenomena. 
It is likewise important to address adaptationism as a form of biological 
reductionism because of the increasing popularity and prevalence of evolutionary 
thinking, previously in the form of sociobiology and currently in the form of evolutionary 
psychology. Certainly there will remain debates over particular evolutionary arguments, 
but some are categorically bad and others are categorically good.  
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 The female orgasm is clearly quite plastic, in the technical biological sense: it is 
“widely variant dependent on the environment” (Lloyd 134). However, unlike the case of 
intelligence, there is no reason to believe that the plasticity of the female orgasm is itself 
directly selected. In general, plasticity decreases with selection, which narrows 
variability, thus focusing in on the optimal formation of a trait (Lloyd 135). Only in cases 
that plasticity itself is optimal, such as intelligence, which develops differently to suit 
demands in different environments, can plasticity be reasonably considered a selected 
trait (Lloyd 134-135). Without such indicators that the female orgasm works better by 
being variable, the variability of the female orgasm suggests instead that it was not 
selected at all. Although female sexual pleasure has direct advantages for reproduction, 
there is no specific reason to consider female orgasms selected. Thus, explaining a feature 
of a biological organism in terms of its separate selection is as problematic as 
androcentrism in the science of the female orgasm surveyed by Lloyd. 
The alternate theory preferred by Lloyd, at least given the current evidence, is that 
the female orgasm is a “fantastic bonus” (Lloyd 2007), a benefit derived from the 
profound adaptive benefits of the male orgasm in providing for reproduction (2005; 
2007). Lloyd finds to be best supported by the evidence Donald Symons’ “byproduct 
account” (Lloyd 2005, 107-148). Symons’ account is equally androcentric to any other 
account of the female orgasm, but that androcentrism does not play into the byproduct 
account itself but only into his interpretation of its implications (Lloyd 2005, 139-145).  
The lack of the female orgasm’s adaptational status by no means undermines its 
social and political importance any more than it undermines the importance of reading, 
which is also not a genetic adaptation—books had no use on the African savannah. 
Likewise the male nipple was not directly significant in evolution, but a byproduct of the 
need for female nipples; they may function in much the same ways but male nipples did 
not directly impact on survival and reproduction.  
The case of the female orgasm is not closed, but in this case and others it is time 
to recognize persistent adaptationism as fallacious, a hasty biological reductionism. There 
is clearly insufficient reason to assume biological determinism in the form of 
adaptationism just as it should not be assumed in the more superficial genetically 
determinant way in the sciences of intelligence. It is ironic that we end up with an 
androcentric evolutionary conclusion about the evolution of the female orgasm by 
resisting fallacious androcentricity in our reasoning about it; however evaluating 
argumentation schemes concerns the process not the product, and the evolutionary 
conclusion has no implications for the political status of the female orgasm. 
The rhetorical appeal of biological reductionism is beyond question. Even Plato 
advocated using it to trick the people in the Republic into accepting their stations in life. 
People are to be taught the Myth of Er, which explains their social positions as a product 
of the type of metal in their souls. This reveals a human cognitive tendency toward 
biological reductionism, insofar as biological thinking existed in Plato’s time (Gould 
1996). Furthermore, in the case of the female orgasm, women tend to be alarmed at the 
notion that their orgasms lack that significance, as if the biological origin were relevant to 
social and political significance. This impact was dramatically evident in the all-round 
hostility Lloyd received on the women’s television talk show, The View (Lloyd 2006). 
The hosts’ categorical rejection of Lloyd’s analysis indicates the attractiveness and 
commonality of biologically reductionist thinking and argumentation. 
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We may be able to classify biological reductionism as a contemporary 
manifestation of the Aristotelian fallacy of accident, in which accidental or contingent 
features are taken to imply general, necessary, or essential features. It has been very 
difficult to makes sense of this fallacy in a culture that denies such essentialist thinking, 
pace Hilary Putnam. Accident seems rather meaningless in contemporary culture where 
there is no other general tendency to explicitly distinguish accidental from essential 
properties. Further exploration of the connection between biological reductionism and 
accident is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the apparent connection indicates 
how fallacies recognized in contemporary science studies may resonate with the past, and 
shows one way in which situating fallacy theory has significant intellectual dividends. 
 
5. CONCLUSION: PRESENTLY SITUATING FALLACY THEORY 
 
In beginning to consider ways to update fallacy theory and make it reflexive and 
progressive rather than static and archaic, there are a range of intellectual and scholarly 
implications, and some profound pedagogical implications. We must consider how 
androcentrism and biological reductionism fit into our lists of fallacies, and impact on the 
issues in fallacy theory. Fallacy theory can be further situated through empirical sources, 
taking science studies as the starting point. This progressive situation of fallacy theory 
will be fruitful as an educational tool, because it can be tailored to student needs to a 
degree beyond any other approach to reasoning. 
To account for forms of sexism beyond androcentrism and to account for other 
patterns of socially unjust reasoning including racist and heterocentric appeals we might 
appeal to a general hegemonic reasoning, that is centering discussion on those with social 
privilege. Such a general notion is needed to replace the fallacy of provincialism 
identified by Howard Kahane in 1971 (pp. 54-56) that assumes the guilty arguer must be 
a member of the privileged group. It can only account for the androcentrism of men. 
Later on in Kahane’s 1995 edition of Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric and the 2005 
edition coauthored by Nancy Cavender stop treating provincialism as a logical fallacy at 
all and begin treating it as a character-driven impediment to cogent reasoning (1995, pp. 
107-109; 2005, pp. 119-124). The later account is more adequate in some ways, because 
it relates provincialism to prejudice and to stereotypes in various ways, which we might 
assume could be held by anyone in society however privileged or oppressed. However, 
Kahane and Cavender still neglect to recognize that these dispositions are so widespread 
that they are not merely personal idiosyncrasies, but a pervasive disruption the logic of 
argumentation itself, as feminist science studies demonstrates about androcentrism. 
Furthermore, Kahane and Cavender persistently assume that only insiders would 
privilege insiders, neglecting the reality of psychological oppression and the play of 
stereotypes and prejudices far beyond the exchanges among those who benefit from their 
currency. Presuming the perspective of the insiders, omitting the experience of people on 
the social margins, such as women, indicates that hegemonic reasoning. This unfortunate 
taint on the very important steps forward made by Kahane in identifying provincialism 
can be remedied by reconceiving the problem in terms of hegemonies, including 
androcentrism. 
In fact, at the beginning of the 21st century there is no further need to empirically 
demonstrate the commonality in the global North or the falseness of androcentrism; and 
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there can be no better demonstration of an appearance of correct reasoning than that false 
moves are made so frequently. On the other hand, there is a great deal more scholarly 
work to be done on biological reductionism, ascertaining what forms might be 
appropriate and what might not.  
Furthermore there are many questions to be asked about the attractiveness of 
biological reductionism. Why does it attract us? What is the source of that commonplace 
naturalistic urge? Why have theorists failed to recognize that the fallacy of accident 
persists in that form? These questions are important for the epistemology of science, 
especially given the recent flood of sociobiological and evolutionary psychological books 
and articles. These popular arguments satisfy our taste for biological reductionism but 
may create a substantial ignorance that interferes with real understanding and 
knowledge.3 
I expect that other fallacies can be recognized also through science studies, which 
will help us also to flesh out the hegemonic fallacy in regard to race, and class, and other 
dimensions of social injustice aside from sexism. We should also seek input from 
cognitive psychology to provide further empirical basis for a list of contemporary 
fallacies. New recognitions of mistakes in reasoning might also be drawn from the 
emerging literature on experimental philosophy that shows our intuitions about good 
moral reasoning are often quite different from how we actually reason.  
All of these measures will better situate our discussion of fallacies. However, this 
is not a job that can ever be complete because of the ways in which our reasoning and 
argumentation change and develop. As our reasoning progresses and changes we will 
have new perspectives on argumentation and also new forms of argumentation to 
consider. 
The forms of argumentation that can be addressed in a list of fallacies also need to 
be tailored to the audience, the situation, and especially the needs and abilities of 
students. As a means of teaching reasoning, a situated fallacy theory could be ideal 
because it could be tailored to the particular context and content of education. Although 
in the global North in general we need to address the androcentric fallacy, identifying the 
problem as a fallacy may help to eliminate it historically. It might become diminished 
substantially enough that there would no longer be a need to identify it as a fallacy. 
Similarly, Hamblin suggests that Aristotle may well have eradicated the fallacy of accent 
by pointing it out and encouraging the development of written accents (1995/70, p. 23).  
There remains a lot more to be understood about biological reductionism, but it is 
clearly needed in classes of science students, especially given the popularity of 
evolutionary psychology. Among additions and revisions to our lists of fallacies, we may 
find new species of previously recognized fallacies, such as accent, but also fallacies 
arising from new forms of reasoning, especially in the sciences. For instance, economics 
seems lead us occasionally into the fallacy of “eating money,” identified by Val 
Plumwood (personal correspondence). This mistake of economic growth as a measure of 
human welfare is common in industrialized capitalist society, but needs especially to be 
recognized by business and economics students who seem most vulnerable to it. How 
else we might situate fallacies and tailor the instruction of critical thinking to particular 
student needs and epistemic responsibilities is an open question. There is a great deal 
more work to be done in situating fallacy theory, and scholars must treat this approach as 
                                                 
3 This understanding of ignorance is developed by Charles Mills (1991). 
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an ongoing responsibility, especially to prepare our students for the cognitive challenges 
in a changed and changing world. 
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